Local Government Reorganisation: The Review and Its Aftermath by Steve Leach

Author:Steve Leach [Leach, Steve]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138995505
Google: MvghjwEACAAJ
Goodreads: 30690005
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1998-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

(b) Concentration

Public choice arguments on concentration imply that an equal distribution of market shares across tiers or between the units within a tier will stimulate good performance. By contrast, if a part of the local government system has a high market share then this is likely to impair efficiency and responsiveness.

TABLE 1

HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION (DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ACROSS LOCAL UNITS)

Notes:

1. Coefficient of variation

2. Population in thousands

Horizontal concentration can be measured by analysing the distribution of population across local units in a given geographical market.47 The variation in population across units in the old and new local government systems is shown in Table 1. In Scotland, market shares are more evenly spread in the new structure than in the old: the coefficient of variation for population size is substantially lower in the unitary authorities than in the regions and districts. This is partly because of the removal from the local government map of units at the extremes of the population range (for example, Strathclyde region and Nairn district). Big urban authorities such as Glasgow and Edinburgh retain a dominant position in their territorial sub-markets, but from a public choice perspective the greater equalisation of market shares is a positive outcome. In Wales, the impact of reorganisation on horizontal concentration is more mixed. The population sizes of the new units are spread more evenly than the former districts, but more widely than the counties. The net effect of structural change on the geographical distribution of power in the local government market is therefore indeterminate.

Population figures cannot be used to assess vertical concentration because several tiers cover the same territory. This dimension of vertical structure can be measured with financial data, such as the share of total local government spending taken by each tier. It is not possible as yet to apply this measure because expenditure out-turn data for the new unitary, supraunitary and sub-unitary authorities are not available. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that the new pattern of vertical concentration will be an improvement from a public choice perspective. The unitary authorities seem likely to retain, on average, the highly dominant market share of the regions and counties. However, there is less potential for monopolistic behaviour because the new councils are subject to greater pressures from horizontal competition than were the former upper-tier authorities.

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